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Abstract. We explore cryptographic primitives with low multiplicative
complexity. This is motivated by recent progress in practical applica-
tions of secure multi-party computation (MPC), fully homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE), and zero-knowledge proofs (ZK) where primitives from
symmetric cryptography are needed and where linear computations are,
compared to non-linear operations, essentially “free”. Starting with the
cipher design strategy “LowMC” from Eurocrypt 2015, a number of bit-
oriented proposals have been put forward, focusing on applications where
the multiplicative depth of the circuit describing the cipher is the most
important optimization goal.
Surprisingly, albeit many MPC/FHE/ZK-protocols natively support op-
erations in GF(p) for large p, very few primitives, even considering all
of symmetric cryptography, natively work in such fields. To that end,
our proposal for both block ciphers and cryptographic hash functions is
to reconsider and simplify the round function of the Knudsen-Nyberg ci-
pher from 1995. The mapping F (x) := x3 is used as the main component
there and is also the main component of our family of proposals called
“MiMC”. We study various attack vectors for this construction and give
a new attack vector that outperforms others in relevant settings.
Due to its very low number of multiplications, the design lends itself well
to a large class of new applications, especially when the depth does not
matter but the total number of multiplications in the circuit dominates
all aspects of the implementation. With a number of rounds which we
deem secure based on our security analysis, we report on significant per-
formance improvements in a representative use-case involving SNARKs.
Keywords: distributed cryptography, cryptanalysis, block ciphers, hash
functions, zero knowledge
1 Introduction
Modern cryptography developed many techniques that go well beyond solving
traditional confidentiality and authenticity problems in two-party communica-
tion. Secure multi-party computation (MPC), zero-knowledge proofs (ZK), and
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) are some of the most striking examples.
In various applications of these three technologies, part of the circuit or function
that is being evaluated is in turn a cryptographic primitive such as a PRF, a
symmetric encryption scheme, or a collision resistant function.
In this work, we focus on a large class of such applications where the total
number of field multiplications in the underlying cryptographic primitive poses
the largest performance bottleneck. Examples include MPC protocols based on
Yao’s garbled circuit and all ZK-proof system that we are aware of, including
recent developments around SNARKs [BSCG+13] which found practical appli-
cations, e.g., in Zerocash [BCG+14]. This motivates the following question ad-
dressed in this work: How does a construction for a secure block cipher or a
secure cryptographic hash functions look like that minimizes the number of field
multiplications?
Earlier work on specialized designs for such applications, like
LowMC [ARS+15], Kreyvium [CCF+16], or the very recent FLIP [MJSC16] all
consider the case of Boolean multiplications and mostly focus on the depth of
the resulting circuit.
Surprisingly, albeit many MPC/FHE/ZK-protocols natively support opera-
tions in GF(p) for large p, very few candidates, even considering all of symmetric
cryptography, exist which natively work in such fields. Our focus in this paper
is hence on multiplications in the larger fields GF(2m) and GF(p) which is mo-
tivated as follows: As many protocols support multiplications in larger fields na-
tively, encoding of a description in GF(2) is cumbersome and inefficient. Whilst
is is possible to do bit operations over Fp using standard tricks (which turn XOR
into a non-linear operation), such a conversion is expensive. Consider AES as an
example: it allows for an efficient description in a variety of field sizes. This is
also the reason why the bit-cased LowMC which lower number of AND gates can
often barely, if at all, outperform AES in actual implementations of the GMW
MPC protocols), despite being much better than AES in terms of GF(2) metrics.
This is also partly due to the very high number of XORs computed in LowMC
resulting them to be no longer negligible.
Contributions and related work. The design we propose is extremely sim-
ple: A function F (x) := x3 is iterated with subkey additions. This is described
in detail in Section 2. In fact, our design is a simplified variant of a design by
Nyberg and Knudsen [KN95] from the 1990s, which was aimed to demonstrate
ways to achieve provable security against the then emerging differential and lin-
ear attacks, using a small number of rounds (smaller than, say, DES). However,
not much later, [JK97] showed very efficient, even practical interpolation attacks
on such proposals. Indeed, our proposal resembles PURE , a design introduced
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in [JK97] in order to present their attack. We pick up this work from almost
20 years ago and study in earnest if a much higher number of rounds can make
this design secure in Section 4. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that the re-
quired much higher number of rounds (in the order of 100s instead of 10 or less)
is very competitive when it comes to the new application areas of symmetric
cryptography that motivate this work.
We propose several variants of our design called MiMC: variants for GF(p)
and GF(2n) as well as variants that use the cube mapping directly or in a Feis-
tel structure. MiMC can be used for encryption as well as for collision-resistant
cryptographic hashing. See Section 2 for the basic variant in GF(2n) and Sec-
tion 5 for a discussion on the other variants. MiMC is distinguished from any of
the many constructions that have been proposed in this field recently to the ex-
tent that it contradicts popular belief: A recent standard textbook [KR11, Sect.
8.4] explicitly considers such constructions as “not serious, for various reasons”.
Metrics. Given the wide variety of applications and protocols, no simple metric
will be able to reliably predict application level performance. Issues of conversion
between various field types (as the conversion between GF(2) and GF(p) men-
tioned above, which can be quite costly) add to the complication. Nevertheless,
in order to give at least some hint towards expected performance, we will use
the minimal number of AND to compute an output (minANDs) and the average
number of ANDs needed per input bit (ANDs/bit) on various bit-based designs.
Likewise, for designs operating in GF(p), the minimal number of multiplications
to compute an output (minMULs) and the average number of multiplications
needed per input bit (MULs/bit) will be used. A detailed comparison with var-
ious constructions in GF(p) and GF(2) can be found in Section 3. Later on in
the benchmarking part in Section 6.1, we will also come across the case of an
extremely imbalanced LowMC-variant where this simple metric clearly fails to
predict actual performance.
Implementation Results. The hashing mode for GF(p) may prove to be par-
ticularly useful as it is the first of its kind, despite various applications in verifi-
able computing [CFH+15] and applications of SNARKS like Zerocash [BCG+14]
requiring such a function. Due to a lack of an alternative, authors implemented
and optimized SHA-256, which leads to a bottleneck in efficiency. We demon-
strate that MiMC compares very favorably in such an application. Based on
our experiments and implementations, we report a factor 5 improvement in Sec-
tion 6.1. We briefly mention more direct implementations in Section 6.2 and
discuss the suitability of the design for cheap protection against higher-order
side-channel attacks in Section 6.3.
In follow-up to this work [GRR+16], it was found that MiMC is also a very
competitive candidate as an MPC-friendly PRF. Compared to AES, benchmark
results showed that MiMC has a more than 10 times higher throughput in the
online phase, and still about six times faster in the oﬄine/precomputation phase
in the LAN setting. Even the latency, which one could expect to be relatively
3
high for MiMC due to its serial nature and the relatively high number of rounds,
is better than the latency of AES. Note that for the AES case, this does not
include conversion losses due to the application not using the AES field GF(28),
and hence the difference in real-world application settings will likely be larger.
2 The MiMC primitives
In the following, we describe a block cipher, a permutation, and a permutation-
based cryptographic hash function with a low number of multiplications in a
finite field Fq (alternatively GF(q)) where q is either a prime p or a power of 2.
2.1 The block cipher
In order to achieve an efficient implementation over a field Fq (with q either
prime or a power of 2), i.e., to minimize computationally expensive multiplica-
tions in the field, our design operates entirely over Fq, thereby avoiding S-boxes
completely. More precisely, we use a permutation polynomial over Fq as round
function. In the following, we restrict ourselves to F2n and we denote by MiMC-
b/κ a keyed permutation with block size b and key size κ. The concept however
equally applies to Fp, which we will discuss briefly in Section 5.
MiMC-n/n. Our block cipher is constructed by iterating a round function r
times where each round consists of a key addition with the key k, the addition of
a round constant ci ∈ F2n , and the application of a non-linear function defined as
F (x) := x3 for x ∈ F2n . For a discussion of this particular choice of polynomial
and alternatives, we refer to Section 5.3. The ciphertext is finally produced by
adding the key k again to the output of the last round. Hence, the round function
is described as Fi(x) = F (x ⊕ k ⊕ ci) where c0 = cr = 0 and the encryption
process is defined as
Ek(x) = (Fr−1 ◦ Fr−2 ◦ . . . F0)(x)⊕ k.
We choose n to be odd and the number of rounds as r =
⌈
n
log2 3
⌉
. The r − 1
round constants are chosen as random elements from F2n .
X3 X3X3x y
k k ⊕ c1 kk ⊕ cr−1
Fig. 1: r rounds of MiMC-n/n
Note that the random constants ci do not need to be generated for every
evaluation of MiMC. Instead the constants are fixed once and can be hard-coded
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into the implementation on either side. No extra communication is thus needed,
just as with round constants in LowMC, AES, or in fact any other cipher.
Decryption for MiMC-n/n can be realized analogously to encryption by
reversing the order of the round constants and using F−1(x) := xs with
s = (2n+1 − 1)/3 instead of F (x) := x3 (the complete derivation of s is given in
Sect. 4, Lemma 1). Hence, encryption and decryption need to be implemented
separately. Furthermore, decryption is much more expensive than encryption.
Using modes where the inverse is not needed is thus advisable. We note that
for our targeted applications, such as PRFs or cryptographic hash functions,
computing the inverse is usually not required. We therefore provide benchmark
results only for the encryption function. The fact that the inverse has a more
complex algebraic description also has a beneficial effect on security as it lim-
its cryptanalytic approaches that try to combine the encryption and decryption
direction, such as inside-out approaches.
MiMC-2n/n (Feistel). By using the same non-linear permutation in a Feistel
network, we can process larger blocks at the cost of increasing the number of
rounds by a factor of two. The round function of MiMC-2n/n is defined as
following
xL‖xR ←− xR ⊕ (xL ⊕ k ⊕ ci)3‖xL.
The round constants ci are again random elements of F2n except for the first and
last round constants which are equal to 0. In the last round, the swap operation is
not applied. The number of rounds for the Feistel version is r′ = 2·r = 2·
⌈
n
log2 3
⌉
,
where r is the number of rounds of MiMC-n/n.
Decryption for MiMC-2n/n can easily be realized by using the encryption
function with reversed order of round constants, as usual for Feistel networks.
2.2 The permutation
To construct the permutation MiMCP from the cipher MiMC as described above,
we simply set the key to the all-0 string.
2.3 The hash function
For the hash function MiMChash, we propose to instantiate the permutation
MiMCP in the sponge framework [BDPA08]. Given a permutation of size n, and
a desired security level s, we can hash r = n−2s bits per call to the permutation.
The MiMC permutation can be realized either in the SPN mode or Feistel mode
by setting the key to 0κ where κ is the size of the key in bits. MiMCHash-`
denotes the hash function with ` bit output.
As usual, the message is first padded according to the sponge specification
so that the number of message blocks is a multiple of r where r is the rate in
sponge mode. For MiMCHash-t we use MiMC-n/n permutation where n = 4·t+1
and s = 2 · t. For MiMCHash-256 we thus use a MiMC-n/n permutation with
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n = 1025. The rate and the capacity are chosen as 512 and 513 respectively. This
choice allows for processing the same amount of input bits as SHA-256 (512 bits)
while at the same time offering collision security of 128-bits and preimage security
of 256-bits, and in contrast to SHA-256 also full 256-bit 2nd-preimage security
independent of the message length. We also propose MiMCHash-256b, which also
offers collision resistance of 128 bits but only 128-bit security against preimage-
style attacks, similar to SHAKE-256 as specified in the new SHA-3 standard.
This construction makes use of a MiMC-n/n permutation where n = 769. The
rate and the capacity are chosen as 512 and 257 respectively. More generally
for MiMCHash-tb, we use the MiMC-n/n permutation where n = 3 · t + 1 and
s = t+ 1.
3 Related designs and comparison
In this section, we give an overview of related designs, i.e. symmetric primitives
which are based on arithmetic operations in some ring.
3.1 Knudsen-Nyberg cipher
As discussed above, our design can be seen as a resurrection of a design due to
Knudsen and Nyberg in [KN95], who proposed a DES-like cipher using a similar
idea for non-linear mappings in a finite field. The Feistel round function of the
64-bit KN-cipher uses an affine mapping e : F232 → F237 to first transform the
32-bit input into a 37-bit value. After addition with a 37-bit round key, the
resulting 37-bit value is then input to the non-linear permutation g : x→ x3 in
F237 . Five bits of the output of g are then discarded to reduce the final output
again to 32 bits. In summary, one application of the round function is given as
xL||xR → xR||xL ⊕ f(e(xR)⊕ ki)
where f consists of application g followed by discarding one bit. The KN ci-
pher is a six-round Feistel design with six 37-bit independent round keys and is
provably secure against differential attacks. However, it is vulnerable to an inter-
polation attack (see below) because of the low algebraic degree of the polynomial
corresponding to the encryption function. The Feistel variant of our design —
MiMC-2n/n — can be easily recognized as a variant of the KN cipher, except for
that we do not discard any bits (and hence always stay in the same field), add
independent round constants and have a higher number of rounds. Indeed, our
design more closely resembles PURE , the cipher used in [JK97] to demonstrate
the vulnerability of the KN cipher to interpolation attacks, except for the higher
number of rounds in our design. The performance of both designs essentially
differs linearly in by how much we extend the number of rounds. We note that
our GCD attack in Section 4.2 also extends to PURE and allows to reduce the
number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required for a successful cryptanalysis.
6
3.2 The Pohlig-Hellman Cipher
The Pohlig-Hellman cipher was described in [PH78]. Choose a prime p. Pick
1 ≤ k ≤ p − 2 with gcd(k, p − 1) = 1 and 1 ≤ d ≤ p − 2 with d = k−1 mod
p − 1, with p public and k and d private. To encrypt the message 1 ≤ m ≤
p − 1 compute c = mk mod p. To decrypt compute m = cd mod p. Encryption
and decryption take between log2 p and 2 log2 p multiplications depending on
the Hamming weights of k and d. A key recovery attack solves the discrete
logarithm problem in Fp. The General Number Field Sieve solves this problem
in complexity exp
((
3
√
64
9 + o(1)
)
(ln p)
1
3 (ln ln p)
2
3
)
= Lp
[
1
3 ,
3
√
64
9
]
. Thus for n-
bit security, the number of multiplications required grows faster than O(n).
3.3 Naor-Reingold PRF
The Naor-Reingold PRF [NR97] is a pseudorandom function whose security can
be reduced to the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. For a given n ∈ N, primes
p and q with q dividing p− 1, an element g ∈ F∗p of order q, and n+ 1 elements
a0, . . . , an ∈ Zq, and an n-bit input x1, . . . , xn ∈ F2 define
fp,q,g,a(x1, . . . , xn) := g
a0
∏
xi=1
ai
where (g,a) is the secret key. Evaluation of the function corresponds to one
exponentiation in Fp and n multiplications in Zq. Thus it takes between p and
2p multiplications in Fp. As the security of this primitive can be reduced to the
decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, just as with the Pohlig-Hellman cipher, for n
bit security the number of multiplications grows faster than O(n).
3.4 Ajtai, SWIFFT, SWIFFTX
SWIFFT [LMPR08] is a hash function family related to hard problems in lat-
tices. In can be seen in the tradition of the work of Ajtai [Ajt96] and was used
as a building block for the SWIFFTX SHA-3 submission [ADL+08]. The hash
function consists of an application of the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT)
over Z257 and in dimension 64 to m = 16 blocks of n = 64 bits. Each such trans-
form costs 12n log2 n = 3 ·n = 192 multiplications by a constant per 64 bits. The
output of the NTT is then pointwise multiplied with 64 random fixed elements
in Z257, costing another 64 multiplications. For m ·n bits of input the algorithm
scales linearly in m, so require mn(1+ 12 log2 n) operations for m ·n bits of input.
On modern microprocessors most of these multiplications can be avoided by us-
ing precomputed lookup tables and some specifically chosen constants. However,
it is not clear that these techniques translate to our setting. Furthermore, we
note that multiplication by small constants can be more efficient than general
multiplications in, e.g. homomorphic encryption schemes. On the other hand, the
constants in an NTT are not small a priori. Still, our analysis might be somewhat
pessimistic. We note that SWIFFT itself does not fulfil standard requirements
for general purpose hash functions and that SWIFFTX addresses these issues
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by running four SWIFFT instances (increasing the number of multiplications
accordingly) and by introducing an S-box.
3.5 SPRING
SPRING [BBL+15] is PRF proposal with security related to the Learning with
Errors (LWE) problem. Similarly, to SWIFFT this construction employs an NTT
over Z257, but at dimension n = 128. This costs 12n log2 n = 448 multiplications
in Z257. Additional, k multiplications in Z257 are required in a post-processing
step for k ∈ {64, 128} being the bit size of the input to the PRF. Hence, for
k = 128 we expect 576 multiplications in Z257. We note that these multiplications
can be realized efficiently on modern CPUs, but not necessarily in the scenarios
targeted in this work.
3.6 Comparison
In Table 1 we compare MiMC with various block cipher and PRF designs. In
Table 2 we compare MiMC with various cryptographic hash function proposals.
In both cases, we notice a big difference between MiMC instantiations, and
other designs for the two metrics that interest us: (1) the minimal number of
multiplications needed to encrypt a block or at least n bits (minMULs), and
(2) the number of multiplications per encrypted bit. For the GF(p) version of
MiMC, the number of multiplications has to be multiplied by 2.
4 Design Rationale and Analysis of MiMC
In this section we explain the design rationale of the keyed permutation and
argue its security. The monomial x3 serves as the non-linear layer of the block
cipher. Note that we can use x3 to construct the cipher iff it is a permutation
monomial in the field F2n . The following well known result governs the choice of
the monomial and size of the field in the design of MiMC.
Proposition 1 Any monomial xd is a permutation in the field F2n iff
gcd(d, 2n − 1) = 1.
Hence, x → x3 is not a permutation in F2n when n is even but only when n is
odd. In particular, choosing thus n = 2t + 1 ensures that x3 is a permutation in
F2n .
Moreover, using the previous proposition, we can compute the inverse of the
non-linear permutation x3 in F2n .
Lemma 1. Let n an odd integer. The inverse of the non-linear function x3 in
F2n is given by xs with s := (2n+1 − 1)/3.
Proof. Given y = x3, we are looking for an s such that x = ys in GF (2n),
that is x3·s = x. By Fermat’s little theorem, this is equivalent to look for an s
8
Name Security minANDs ANDs/bit Remarks and Reference
AES-128 128 5120 40 GF(2) rep. [BP12] ([BMP13])
Simon 128 4352 34 [BSS+13]
Noekeon 128 2048 16 [DPVAR00]
Robin 128 3072 24 [GLSV14]
Fantomas 128 2112 16.5 [GLSV14]
LowMC 128 1132 8.85 [ARS+15]
Grain-128a 128 4864 + 19 · n 19 [A˚HJM11]
Trivium 80 1152 + 3 · n 3 [CP08]
Kreyvium 128 1152 + 3 · n 3 [CCF+16]
minMULs MULs/bit
AES-128 128 800 6.25 GF(24) rep. [CGP+12]
SPRING 128 576 4.5 [BBL+15]
Pohlig-Hellman 128 3072 ≈ 1.5 [PH78,ENI13]
MiMC-129/129 129 82 0.64 this paper
MiMC-258/129 129 164 0.64 this paper
Table 1: Comparison of ciphers in encryption mode (excluding key schedule).
We list the size-optimized variants. Note that in most cases multiplication refers
to the field GF(2) (minANDs and ANDs/bit) whereas in MiMC and others
multiplication is in a larger field(minMULs and MULs/bit). For stream ciphers
we give the minANDs needed to generate n bits of output.
such that 3 · s = 1 (mod 2n − 1). That is, there exists an integer t such that
3 · s = 1 + t · 2n − 1. By Proposition 1, we have that gcd(3, 2x − 1) = 1 if and
only if x is odd (i.e. gcd(3, 2x − 1) = 3 if and only if x is even). For t = 1, we
obtain 3 · s = 2n which is a contradiction. If t is equal to 2, then 3 · s = 2n+1− 1.
Since n+ 1 is even (by hypothesis), then 3 divides 2n+1 − 1. Finally, since x3 is
a permutation in GF (2n) for n odd (by previous proposition), then the inverse
is unique and is given by s := (2n+1 − 1)/3. uunionsq
4.1 Computation Cost Model
In most models of computation field multiplication is considered to be more
computationally expensive than addition. However, note that squaring is a linear
operation in a binary field F2n . Hence, if we consider the number of non-linear
multiplications in a binary field then the number required to compute x3 is one.
In the SNARK setting, each witness variable (and possibly each constraint) is
generated from a field operation more specifically from a field multiplication. As
a consequence, computing x3 generates two equations x · x = y and y · x = x3.
Hence, in this setting we do not benefit from the linearity of squaring over the
fields F2n and computing x3 costs two multiplications. However, the cost of
additions in these fields is still negligible compared to that of multiplication.
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Name Coll. Resist. minANDs ANDs/bit Remarks and Reference
SHA-256 128 29000 56.64 [BCG+14])
SHA3-256 128 38400 35.29 [NIS14]
SHAKE128 128 38400 28.57 [NIS14]
minMULs MULs/bit
SWIFFTX 112–256 16384 8.0 [ADL+08]
MiMCHash-256 129 1293 2.52 this paper
MiMCHash-256b 129 971 1.89 this paper
Table 2: Comparison of hash functions. We list the size-optimized variants.
Note that in most cases multiplication refers to the field GF(2) (minANDs and
ANDs/bit) whereas in MiMC multiplication is in a larger field (minMULs and
MULs/bit).
Note that we can also disregard the cost of multiplication by a constant. Details
on the form of equations involved in SNARK is given in Section 6.
We stress that although the cost of an addition is considered negligible com-
pared to a multiplication, very large number of additions can reduce the efficiency
of a design.
4.2 Security analysis
Our designs resist a variety of cryptanalysis techniques. The algebraic design
principle of MiMC causes a natural concern about the security of the keyed per-
mutation against algebraic cryptanalytic techniques. We describe several possible
algebraic attacks (incl. a new “GCD” attack) against the design and analyze the
resistance of the block cipher against these attacks. We also consider statistical
attacks.
To summarize the following results, the number of rounds for the case of
MiMC-n/n is derived from an interpolation attack, while the number of rounds
for the case of MiMC-2n/n is deduced from a Meet-in-the-Middle GCD attack.
Finally, in Appendix B, we discuss the case in which some restrictions on the
memory that the attacker can use to implement the attack hold. We show that
in this case it is possible to reduce the total number of rounds.
Interpolation Attack. Interpolation attacks, introduced by Jakobsen and
Knudsen [JK97], construct a polynomial corresponding to the encryption func-
tion without knowledge of the secret key. If an adversary can construct such
a polynomial then for any given plaintext the corresponding ciphertext can be
produced without knowledge of the secret key.
Let Ek : F2n → F2n be an encryption function. For a randomly fixed key
k, the polynomial P (x) representing Ek(x) can be constructed using Lagrange’s
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theorem, where x is the indeterminate corresponding to the plaintext. If the
polynomial has degree d then we can find it using Lagrange’s formula
P (x) =
d∑
i=1
yi
∏
1≤j≤d,i6=j
x− xj
xi − xj
where Ek(xi) = yi for i = 1, 2, . . . d.
This method can be extended to a key recover attack. The attack proceeds
by simply guessing the key of the final round, decrypting the ciphertexts and
constructing the polynomial for r − 1 rounds. With one extra p/c pair, the
attacker checks whether the polynomial is correct.
Observe that the number of unknown coefficients of the interpolation poly-
nomial is d + 1 and that the complexity of constructing a Lagrangian interpo-
lation polynomial is O(d log d) [Sto85]. Hence, setting d = 3r with r = rmax ≈
n/ log2(3) thwarts this attack. Note that no function mapping from GF(2
n) to
GF(2n) has degree ≥ 2n, since T 2n−1 ≡ 1 for each T ∈ F2n and the degree of
the interpolation polynomial does not increase for r > rmax.
By the same argument, a similar result holds for the case of the Feistel
network MiMC-2n/n. Indeed, at each round the left/right hand part of the
state can be described as a polynomial of the left and of the right hand part of
the plaintext, with at most 32r−1 + 3r + 3r−1 + 1 unknown coefficients (observe
that at round r, the degree of the polynomial is at most 3r in the left part of
the plaintext and 3r−1 in the right part). Thus, the complexity of constructing
this Lagrangian interpolation polynomial is approximately O(r · 32r), where a
function mapping from GF(2n)
2
to GF(2n) has degree at most 22n.
Note that in the chosen-plaintext scenario and in the case of MiMC-2n/n, an
attacker can reduce the degree of the interpolation polynomial. For example, for
chosen plaintexts of the form x||x3 the degree of the interpolation polynomial
after r rounds is at most 2 · 3r−1 in the left part of the plaintext and 2 · 3r−2
in the right part, while for chosen plaintexts of the form 0||x the degree of the
interpolation polynomial is at most 3r−1 in the left part of the plaintext and
3r−2 in the right part. Thus, for this second case, the interpolation polynomial
of the right part of the text depends only by the right part of the plaintexts and
has degree 3r−2. In order to avoid the reduced degree of the polynomial, it is
sufficient to add (at least) two rounds more to the number of rounds calculated
for MiMC-n/n.
A meet-in-the-middle variant of the interpolation attack was also proposed
in [JK97], constructing a polynomials g(x) = h(y) instead of one polynomial
y = f(x). For MiMC-n/n, this approach does not produce an improvement
due to the prohibitive degree of the inverse operation. In contrast, for MiMC-
2n/n we have that g and h may have degree 3r/2 in the left part of the plain-
text and 3r/2−1 in the right part only instead of degree 3r and 3r−1 respec-
tively. However, this lower degree comes at the price of increases computational
cost. Indeed, constructing g and h requires solving a system of equation in
n = 2 · (3r/2 + 1) · (3r/2−1 + 1) unknowns costing O(nω) = O(3r) operations,
where the hidden constant is ≥ 1 and we conservatively set the linear algebra
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constant ω = 2. The chosen plaintext variant of this attack is quite similar. As
before, the idea is to choose plaintexts in which the left part is fixed. In this
way, one of the two interpolation polynomial depends only on one variable, the
right part of the plaintext. Thus, constructing g and h requires solving a sys-
tem of equation in n = (3r/2−2 + 1) + (3r/2 + 1) · (3r/2−1 + 1) unknowns costing
O(n2) = O(3r−1) operations where the hidden constant is ≥ 1.
We note that the complexity of an interpolation attack may decrease if the
polynomial P (x) is sparse for a chosen key. However, because we are adding
random round constants in each round and x3 is a permutation in F2n by con-
struction, our P (x) is not expected to be sparse4.
Computing GCDs. From the description of MiMC, it is clear that factoriz-
ing univariate polynomials recovers the key. However, if we are given more than
one known plaintext-ciphertext pair, we can reduce the complexity further by
computing a GCD of them. Denote by E(k, x) the encryption of x under key
k. For a pair (x, y) ∈ F2q, E(K,x)− y denotes a univariate polynomial in Fq[K]
corresponding to (x, y). Note that in general, given plaintext/ciphertext pair
(x, y), it should be hard for a generic encryption scheme to compute the uni-
variate polynomial E(K,x)− y explicitly in the variable K (i.e. the secret key).
However, this is not the case of MiMC, for which the polynomial E(K,x) − y
can be always computed explicitly, and it simply corresponds to the definition
of encryption process (that is, the iterative application of the cubic function).
Moreover, note that this attack may also be applied to PURE , the cipher used
in [JK97] to demonstrate the vulnerability of the KN cipher to interpolation
attacks, assuming round keys are not independent but linearly derived from k.
Consider now two such polynomials E(K,x1) − y1 and E(K,x2) − y2, with
y1 = E(k, x1) and y2 = E(k, x2) for the fixed but unknown key k. It is clear
that these polynomials share (K − k) as a factor. Indeed, with high probability
the greatest common divisor will be (K − k). Thus, by computing the GCD of
the two polynomials, we can find the value of k.
MiMC-n/n for a known plaintext x corresponds to a polynomial having de-
gree 3r, where the leading monomial always has non-zero coefficient. Hence, we
can recover k with a GCD computation of two polynomials at degree 3r (indeed,
4 This claim is supported by our experiments. In particular, for a field F2n and using
x3 as permutation, we observed:
– after 1 round, all terms appear (percentage: 100 %);
– after 2 round, 8 terms appear instead of 10 (percentage: 80 %);
– after 3 round, 19 terms appear instead of 28 (percentage: 67.86 %);
– after 4 round, 54 terms appear instead of 82 (percentage: 65.85 %);
– after 5 round, 161 terms appear instead of 244 (percentage: 66 %);
– after 6 round, 531 terms appear instead of 730 (percentage: 72.74 %);
and so on, where the percentage of the non-null terms continues to grow for the next
rounds. For example, for the particular field GF (217), after 10 rounds almost all the
terms are non-zero.
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considering differences of two polynomials G(K,xi) − yi reduces this degree to
3r − 1 by canceling the leading term). It is well-known that the complexity for
finding GCD of two polynomials of degree d is O(d log2 d). Hence, the complexity
of this attack is O(r2 · 3r). For MiMC-n/n the time complexity of this attack is
higher than that of the interpolation attack.
More care must be taken for MiMC-2n/n, since in this case the meet-in-the-
middle variant of this attack can be performed. That is, instead of constructing
polynomials expressing ciphertexts as polynomials in the plaintext and the key,
we can construct two polynomials G′(K,xi) and G′′(K, yi) expressing the state
in round r/2 as a polynomial in the key and the plaintext or ciphertext respec-
tively. Then, considering G′(K,x1) − G′′(K, y1) and G′(K,x2) − G′′(K, y2) we
can apply a GCD attack on polynomials of degree 3r/2, reducing the complexity
to O(r2 · 3r/2). Hence, to thwart this attack we must increase the number of
rounds to r = 2 · rmax ≈ 2 · n/ log2(3).
Invariant Subfields. The algebraic structure of MiMC allows to mount a in-
variant subfield attack on the block cipher under a poor choice of round con-
stants. That is, if all the round constants ci and the key k are in subfield F2m
of F2n then by choosing a plaintext x ∈ F2m an adversary can ensure that
Ek(x) ∈ F2m . This attack is thwarted by picking n to be prime. The only sub-
field is then F2 such that picking constants 6= 1 will be enough to avoid the
attack.
Differential attacks. Differential cryptanalysis is one of the most widely used
technique in symmetric-key cryptanalysis. The different types of cryptanalysis
methods based on this technique depend on the propagation of an input differ-
ence through a given number of rounds of an iterative block cipher to yield a
known output difference with high probability. The probability of the propaga-
tion often determines how many rounds can be attacked using this technique.
Given an input difference δ and an output difference δ′, the differential prob-
ability of the round function is given as
Pr (δ → δ′) = |{x ∈ F2n : F (x+ δ) + F (x) = δ′}|/2n (1)
In our case the number of x satisfying F (x+ δ) +F (x) = δ′ is determined by
the non-linear function x3. Hence it is enough to determine the size of the set
D = {x ∈ F2n : (x+ δ)3 + x3 = δ′, δ 6= 0}.
As this is a quadratic equation in x for any, there are at most two solutions to the
equation. This implies Pr (δ → δ′) ≤ 22n . This is sufficient to give any differential
trail of at least two rounds a probability too low to be useful in an attack. A
detailed analysis of the differential property of monomials of the form x2
t+1 in
F2n can be found in [Nyb94] and in [Can97].
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Linear attacks. Similar to differential attacks, linear attacks pose no threat to
MiMC. Indeed, the cubic function is an almost bent or an almost perfect nonlinear
(APN) function, i.e., differential 2-uniform, where an APN permutation provides
the best resistance against linear and differential cryptanalysis. Thus, since its
maximum square correlation is limited to 2−n+1 (cf. for example [AA˚BL12] for
details), any linear trail of the cubing function will have negligible potential after
a few rounds.
Algebraic degree and higher-order differentials. As discussed above, the
large number of rounds ensures that the algebraic degree of MiMC in its native
field will be maximal or almost maximal. This naturally thwarts higher-order
differential attacks when considering the difference as defined in the field (i.e.,
using the inverse of the field addition). But what happens to the degree when
viewing the rounds as vectorial Boolean functions? As squaring is a linear oper-
ation in F2n , it is also linear when viewed as vectorial function over F2. Cubing
on the other hand introduces an additional multiplication which gives the round
function an algebraic degree of 2 in every component when viewed as a vectorial
Boolean function. Again, the large number of rounds should cause the degree to
rise quickly and reach the limit of 2n which is sufficient to thwart any higher-
order differential attacks also when viewing the round function as a vectorial
Boolean function.
Hash-specific security considerations. For usage in the MiMC permutation
in the sponge mode as described in Section 2.3 we require the permutation to
not show non-trivial non-random behavior for up to 2s input/output pairs. As
specified in Section 2 the size of the permutation n determines the number of
rounds (based on the GCD attack described above). As 2s < n for both MiMC-
Hash-256 and MiMCHash-256b, this choices leaves us with an additional security
margin, even if an hypothetical inside-out approach could double the number of
rounds in an attack.
5 Variants
In this section, we discuss two variants of MiMC. One for instantiating MiMC
over prime fields and one for extending the key size to increase security.
5.1 MiMC over prime fields
The above descriptions of MiMC can also be used to operate over prime fields
i.e. a field Fp where p is prime. In that case, it needs to be assured that the
cubing in the round function creates a permutation. For this, it is sufficient to
require gcd(3, p− 1) = 1.
Following the notation as above, we can consider MiMC-p/p where the per-
mutation monomial x3 is defined over Fp. The number of rounds for constructing
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the keyed permutation is r =
⌈
log p)
log2 3
⌉
. In the Feistel mode, we define MiMC-2p/p
where the round function is defined over Fp and where the number of rounds
is double with respect to MiMC-p/p. In both the constructions the r round
constants are chosen as random elements in Fp.
Our cryptanalysis from Section 4 transfers to this case except for the subfield
attack which does not apply here.
5.2 Larger Keys
Instead of considering our simple iterative construction where we add the same
key in each round, we may also consider the case where we have a key which is
κ-times bigger than the block size n. In this case, we may consider an instance
where we are cyclically adding κ independent keys to our rounds. Our i-th round
function then becomes:
Fi(x) = (x⊕ ki mod κ ⊕ ci)3
It is clear that differential and linear cryptanalysis are not affected by this mod-
ification if we model MiMC as a Markov ciphers. However, considering a larger
key size does affect algebraic attacks. In particular, a simple GCD attack is not
sufficient any more to recover the keys k0, k1, . . . , kκ−1. Instead, we may consider
Resultants or Gro¨bner bases.
We consider the case where κ = 2. It is well-known [BKW93] that the maxi-
mum degree reached during a Gro¨bner basis computation of a bivariate system
of equations is ≤ 2 ·maxdeg(P )+1, where maxdeg(P ) is the maximum degree of
our input system (i.e. 3r in our case). Hence, from e.g. [BFS14], the complexity
of solving such a system of equations is
O
(
2 · 3r ·
(
2 · 3r + 3
2 · 3r + 1
))
.
Applying resultants, from [LMS13] we expect a complexity of
O˜ (d4.69) = O˜ (34.69 r) .
Conservatively, we may anticipate a meet-in-the-middle attack which would re-
duce the cost of either of these attacks to a square root of the above estimates.
5.3 Different Round Functions
Considering the case GF(2n), we may consider a round function of the form
F (x) = (x⊕ k ⊕ c)d
for generic exponents d. In particular, we have decided to limit our analysis to
exponents of the form 2t + 1 and 2t− 1, for positive integer t (note that 3 is the
only number that can be written in both ways). Remember that for MiMC-n/n,
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d has to satisfy the condition gcd(d, 2n − 1) = 1 in order to be a permutation,
while in the case of MiMC-2n/n (that is, for Feistel Networks) this condition is
not necessary.
For further analysis, we recall the Lucas’s Theorem:
Theorem 1. For non-negative integers m and n and a prime p, the following
congruence relation holds:(
m
n
)
≡
k∏
i=0
(
mi
ni
)
(mod p),
where m = mkp
k +mk−1pk−1 + ...+m1p+m0 and n = nkpk +nk−1pk−1 + ...+
n1p+n0 are the base p expansions of m and n respectively, using the convention
that
(
m
n
)
= 0 if m < n.
Exponents of the form 2t+1 (with t > 1) have the nice property that the cost
to compute x2
t+1 does not depend on t, i.e. it requires only one multiplication (in
some applications). Moreover, the degree of the resulting r-round interpolation
polynomial is (2t + 1)
r
, which is significantly higher than 3r even for “small” t.
The major problem of this kind of exponents is that the corresponding interpo-
lation polynomials are in general sparse. For example, using Lucas’s Theorem,
it is very easy to note that just after one round the polynomial has only 4 terms
instead of 2t + 2:
(x⊕ k)2t+1 ≡2 (x⊕ k)2
t · (x⊕ k) ≡2
≡2 (x2t ⊕ k2t) · (x⊕ k) ≡2 x2t+1 ⊕ k · x2t ⊕ k2t · x⊕ k2t+1.
Using the same technique, after r rounds, the number of terms of the polyno-
mial is upper bounded by 3r + 1, which is (much) smaller than (2t + 1)r + 1.
Note that 3r + 1 is exact the same upper bounded obtained for the exponent
3 (which corresponds to t = 1). Thus, the number of rounds to guarantee the
security against the algebraic attacks doesn’t change choosing exponent of the
form 2t + 1 for t > 1. That is, both from the security point of view and from
the implementation one, there is no advantage to choose exponents of the form
2t + 1 greater than 3.
Similar considerations can be done also for exponents of the form 2t + 2s =
2s · (2t−s + 1), where s < t.
For this reason, coefficients of the form 2t−1 are more interesting. Indeed, in
this case it is very easy to prove that the interpolation polynomial is not sparse:
(x⊕ k)2t−1 ≡2
2t−1⊕
i=0
xi · k2t−1−i,
since (
2t − 1
i
)
≡2 1 ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2t − 1}.
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On the other hand, in order to compute x2
t−1, we need more multiplications and
square operations. Thus, a natural question is if it is possible to minimize the
total number of multiplications necessary to compute the ciphertext choosing an
exponent of the form 2t − 1 different from 3.
There are different ways to compute ge where g ∈ F2n and e = 2t − 1 for
some t ≥ 2, the classical algorithm being the square-and-multiply algorithm,
cf. [MVO96, Sect. 14.6]. For this algorithm, the number of multiplications re-
quested for this exponent is equal to the number of squares t−1. In Algorithm 1,
we give a slight variation of the original algorithm.
Data: g ∈ F2n and e = 2t − 1 for some t ≥ 2
Result: ge
g0 ← g;
g1 ← g2 · g;
A← 1;
for i from 0 to bt/2c do
A← (A2)2;
A← A · g1;
end
if t mod 2 6= 0 then
A← A2;
A← A · g0;
end
return A.
Algorithm 1: Modular exponentiation with cache
By simple computation, the number of multiplications for the previous algo-
rithm is dt/2e, while the number of squares is t − 1. Observe that with respect
to the original algorithm, it requires precomputation and to store the quantity
g2 · g. Thus, for our purpose, this algorithm is better than the original one (for
the case e = 2t − 1). This algorithm can be improved5, but for our purpose it
suffices.
Thus, using the previous analysis about the number of rounds, the total
number of multiplications m and of squares s for MiMC-n/n (analogous for
MiMC-2n/n) is
m =
⌈
t
2
⌉
·
⌈
n
log2(2
t − 1)
⌉
s = (t− 1) ·
⌈
n
log2(2
t − 1)
⌉
.
5 For example, suppose that t ≥ 8. The idea is to precompute g0, g1 (defined as before)
and also g2 := (g1)
4 ·g1. Thus, in the for loop 0 ≤ i ≤ bt/4c and A← A8 ·g2. Finally,
after the for loop and before the if -statement, one has to take care of the case t
mod 4 6= 0.
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For example, for n = 129, the best result is obtained for t = 4 (that is for the
exponent 15)6, for which the total number of multiplications is 66 (instead of
82 for the exponent 3), while the number of squares is 99 (instead of 82 for the
exponent 3).
Note that the sum of the total number of multiplications m and of the total
number of squares s is almost constant for each choice of t.
Finally, only for completeness, it is also possible to extend the previous anal-
ysis to the case GF (p). In this case, since the square operation is not linear, it
counts as a multiplication. Thus, if we consider an exponent of the form 2t − 1,
the total number of multiplications m for MiMC-p/p is
m =
(⌈
t
2
⌉
+t− 1
)
· log(p− 1)
log(2t − 1) .
To conclude, if the cost of a square operation is negligible with respect to
the cost of a multiplication (that is, if the square operation is linear), then it is
possible to minimize the total number of multiplications choosing an exponent of
the form 2t− 1 different from 3. Instead, when the number of square operations
can not be ignored (as for example in the case of SNARK settings or in the
GF (p) case), the choice of an exponent of the form 2t − 1 different from 3 does
not offer any advantage due to the fact that the number m+s is almost constant.
6 Application and Implementation
We implemented the MiMC block cipher and hash function in C++ using
NTL [Sho]. Note that we put no restriction on the irreducible polynomial to
represent the finite field F2n in our proposal.
6.1 Verifiable Computation and SNARK
Recently, several techniques have been proposed to achieve practical or
nearly practical verifiable computation through constructions such as Pinoc-
chio [PHGR16] and zk-SNARK. A special kind of Succinct Non-interactive Argu-
ment of Knowledge or SNARK was proposed in 2014 to build Zerocash [BCG+14]
— a digital currency similar to Bitcoin but achieving anonymity. In [BSCG+13]
an implementation of a publicly verifiable non-interactive argument system is
given.
The main idea of the SNARK is to provide a circuit whose satisfiability
enables a verifier to check correctness of an underlying computation. In this
concrete implementation, we focus on the (zk)SNARK for arithmetic circuit
satisfiability. The main target of our design proposals is to improve the efficiency
6 Actually, the best result is obtained for t = 6, that is for the exponent 63. But since
gcd(63, 2129 − 1) = 7, the round function defined using the exponent 63 is not a
permutation.
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of (zk)SNARK when they are used as cryptographic primitives in a SNARK
setting.
An F-arithmetic circuit takes input from the field F and its gates produce
output in F. Also the circuits considered here consist of bilinear gates only.
Arithmetic circuit satisfiability (ACS) is defined as follows:
Definition 1. The ACS problem of an F-arithmetic circuit C : Fn × Fh → Fl
is depicted by the relation R = {(x, a) ∈ Fn × Fh : C(x, a) = 0l} such that its
language is L = {x ∈ Fn : ∃a ∈ Fh s.t C(x, a) = 0l}.
Since the circuit consists of bilinear gates only, we aim to minimize the num-
ber of NLM or field multiplications in our design. The addition in the field, which
is the same as bitwise XOR, is a comparatively less expensive operation. The
SNARK algorithm generates the proof for satisfiability of a system of rank-1
quadratic constraints over a finite field. This system of constraints is defined as
below.
Definition 2. A system of rank-1 quadratic equations over a field F is a se-
quence of tuples ((Ai, Bi, Ci), n) for i = 1, . . . , Nc and Ai, Bi, Ci ∈ F1+N ′ such
that n ≤ N ′. This system is satisfiable with an input x ∈ Fn if there is a witness
w ∈ FN ′ such that
〈Ai, w〉 · 〈Bi, w〉 = 〈Ci, w〉 ∀i = 1, . . . , Nc
Here Nc is the number of constraints and N
′ is the number of variables.
The number of such constraints contributes to the efficiency of the SNARK
algorithm. From the above definition it is also clear that in a SNARK setting
over F2m we can not ignore the squaring as linear operation.
MiMC in the SNARK setting. In MiMC, each round can be expressed with
the following equations
X + ki + Ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
+U = 0 (2)
U · U = Y (3)
Y · U = Z (4)
where ki, Ci are the round key and constants respectively. Note that the above
3 equations can be combined to form one rank-1 quadratic constraint (as in
definition 2)
(X + α)(X + α+ Y ) = Y + Z (5)
For the MiMCHash the round key is fixed to a constant hence α can be treated
as a constant in this equation. Note that the number of witness per round of
MiMC is 2. Therefore the total number of witness for the fixed key permuta-
tion is 2 · R, where R ≈ nlog 3 is the number of rounds and n is the block size.
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The witness generation requires one constant addition (XOR) and two multi-
plications in the corresponding field. The complexity of the prover algorithm of
SNARK (appendix E in [BSCG+13]) is dominated by O(Nc logNc) where Nc is
the number of rank-1 constraints.
LowMC in the SNARK setting. In LowMC, each round consists of Sbox (3-
bit), matrix multiplication (over F2), round key and constant addition (XOR).
Each 3-bit Sbox application can be written as
b · c = a+ z1 (6)
a · (c+ 1) = b+ z2 (7)
a · (b+ 1) = b+ c+ z3 (8)
The above three equations can be combined to form 2 rank-1 constraints as
following
b · c = a+ z1 (9)
a · (b+ c) = c+ z2 + z3 (10)
The witness generation for each Sbox requires 3 multiplications and 6 additions
(out of which 2 are constant additions) over F2. In each round there arem Sboxes.
Hence per round the witness generation process will require 3m multiplications
and 6m (2m of them are constant addition) additions per round. Suppose Nb is
the block size of the permutation. Then there will be approximately (l− 1) ·Nb
additions over F2 due to linear layer of LowMC in each round, where l is the
average number of non-zero entries in each row of the random matrix of the
linear layer. Also there will be Nb constant additions over F2 which is due to
round constant and key addition. The total number of rank-1 constraints for R
rounds of LowMC will be R · 2m.
Note that the number of additions are much more in comparison with the
number of multiplication over F2.
Remark 1. For the MiMC permutation, the operations are performed over a
larger field e.g F21025 . Indeed the cost of a single multiplication is higher in
the larger field compared to a multiplication over F2. Moreover, the number of
additions are significantly more than the number of multiplications (see Table
3). Although in the cost model the cost of addition is much less than the cost of
multiplication, very large number of additions over F2 brings down the efficiency
of LowMC in SNARK setting in comparison to MiMC. On the other hand, in
MiMC the number of addition per round is one which is the minimum possible.
Experimental results. Following the libsnark [Lab] implementation we have
implemented a prototype of SNARK for generating the circuit and witness for
MiMC permutation for different block sizes and MiMCHash-256. One important
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target application of MiMC is SNARK or SNARK like algorithms. We have mea-
sured the time taken by MiMCHash for processing a single block and compared
it with the time taken by SHA-256 using the libsnark implementation.
For processing a single block i.e for hashing a single block message our MiMC
implementation in the SNARK setting requires ≈ 7.8 milliseconds to generate
the arithmetic circuit and witness while SHA-256 takes ≈ 73 milliseconds.
Since LowMC was designed for MPC/ZK applications we have also imple-
mented it in the SNARK setting. A comparison of LowMC with MiMC is given
in Table 3.
MiMC LowMC
R = 16 R = 55
m = 196 m = 20
total time 7.8ms 90.3ms 271.2ms
constraint generation 6.3ms 13.5ms 9.2ms
witness generation 1.5ms 76.8ms 262.0ms
# addition 646 8420888 28894643
# multiplication 1293 9408 3300
# rank-1 constraint 646 4704 2200
Table 3: Comparison of LowMC and MiMC with block size 1025 and the corre-
sponding parameters for LowMC. For all implementations we have used the -O3
optimize option of the gcc compiler. Number of rounds and number of Sboxes
per round are denoted as R and m respectively.
If we intend to use the LowMC permutation to construct a hash function
using Sponge mode then the block size of LowMC should be 1025 bit for achieving
the same security level as SHA-256 or MiMCHash-256. We have implemented
LowMC with the updated parameter-set v2 from[ARS+16] with this block size
and two possible choices for the parameters (R,m), where R and m are number
of rounds and number of Sbox per round respectively. One is minimizing the
number of rounds for the given block size and security requirements, the other
one is minimizing the number of ANDs/bit. Both are derived from the round
formula given in [ARS+16].
For all field operations we have used the NTL library together with the gf2x
library. All computations were carried out on an Intel Core i7 2.10GHz processor
with 16GB memory and we took the average over ≈ 2000 repetitions. As a de-
sign with an unusual imbalance between ANDs and XORs, the comparison with
LowMC variants is interesting as it gives an example where the number multi-
plications alone can no longer be used as a hint for the eventual performance.
Where the round-minimized LowMC variant is more than 10 times slower with
about 8 times more multiplications, reducing the number of ANDs in the other
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LowMC variant at the expense of many more rounds does not have the expected
effect: The runtime grows again. The reason is the huge amount of XOR com-
putations whose cost is clearly are no longer negligible. This shows the limits of
a simplified metric that focuses on AND gates (or multiplication gates) also.
More descriptions of the implementations can be found in the supplementary
material in Section C. All implementations in C++ can be found on https:
//github.com/byt3bit/mimc_snark.git.
6.2 Direct implementation
For the sake of completeness we provide a brief discussion of the complexity for
the direct implementation MiMC, but stress that it has limited impact on the
performance on our target platforms. Each round of MiMC-n/n performs one
multiplication in the field F2n . For the considered values of n this computation of
x3 becomes computationally expensive, since it is not feasible to use the efficient
lookup table method even for n = 32, 64.
The evaluation of x3 can be reduced to field multiplication. Since the problem
is frequently encountered in many public-key cryptographic algorithms and pro-
tocols, efficient field multiplication is a well studied area in the literature. One
strategy for efficient field multiplication is to use lookup tables. Indeed, sev-
eral algorithms [GP97,DWBV+96,HMV93] are proposed in the literature which
use precomputed lookup tables to improve the efficiency of finite field multipli-
cation. We briefly describe the complexity for evaluating the monomial using
several algorithms from the literature.
Number of Instructions Look-up Table
XOR ADD,SUB, SHIFT, AND Bit size No. of Access
[HMV93] 2g2 g2
(
3
2
− 1
2(2b−1)
)
2b2b 3g2
[GP97] 6glog 3 − 8 · g + 2 glog 3 2b2b 3glog 3
[KA98] 4g2 — (2b− 1)22b 2g2 + g
[Has00]
(
1
2
(g + 1)(b+ 3)− 4)d n
w
e (g − 1)d n
w
e+ 4g − 2 (b+ d)2b (g − 1)d b+d
w
e
Table 4: Complexities of different algorithms for implementing field multiplica-
tions
In all lookup-table based multiplication algorithms above, b is the size of
the internal data path of the processor. Any element in F2n is partitioned as
a collection into g groups each having b bits. If n is not a multiple of b then
the most significant group will contain n (mod b) bits. Note that the algorithm
in [HMV93] requires n to be multiple of b. Furthermore, d denotes the degree
of the second highest monomial (with non-zero coefficient) in the irreducible
polynomial that defines the field F2n and w denotes the word size of processor.
The resources of a processor are optimally utilized when b = w. For example in
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a 32 bit processor two polynomials can be added using d n32e XOR instructions.
However choosing b = w in this case increases the size of the lookup table to 25
GB for the algorithms from [HMV93,GP97]. On the other hand choosing b < w
may imply lower utilization of processor’s resources. The algorithm described
in [Has00] proposes a better utilization of resources when a small value of b is
chosen to keep the size of the lookup table sufficiently small. Also, this algorithm
does not require n to be multiple of b.
6.3 Generic masking against side-channel attack
Side-channel attacks exploit different types of physical leakage of information e.g.
power consumption or EM emanations during the execution of cryptographic al-
gorithms on a device for recovering sensitive variables (e.g. secret key). Masking
is a well known technique to prevent implementations of cryptographic algo-
rithms from such attacks. Most of the masking schemes usually protect an im-
plementation against first-order attacks. Over the past years several higher-order
side-channel attacks were proposed and demonstrated successfully against many
well-known cryptographic algorithms. Higher order masking schemes are useful
to protect a cryptographic algorithm against such attacks.
In a higher order masking scheme a sensitive variable (e.g. variables involving
secret keys) is split into t+ 1 shares where t is known as the order of masking. It
has been shown that the complexity of side-channel attacks increases exponen-
tially with the masking order.
In FSE 2012 a generic higher order masking scheme [CGP+12] was proposed
by Carlet, Goubin, Prouff, Quisquater and Rivain. For masking an S-box using
CGPQR scheme we need to consider the polynomial corresponding to the S-box,
which can be easily computed from the S-box table using Lagrange’s theorem in a
field F2n . In CGPQR masking scheme evaluation of this polynomial is protected
against higher order attacks. For example, let x be secret variable for which we
evaluate a function f(x). Let x0, x1, . . . , xt are the t+ 1 shares corresponding to
this variable such that x =
⊕t
i=0 xi. Any linear function `(x) is easy to mask
since `(x) = `(x0)⊕ . . .⊕ `(xt). However masking a non-linear function is not as
easy as linear or affine functions.
The operations necessary for evaluating a polynomial in F2n are addition,
multiplication by a scalar, squaring and regular multiplication. For tth order
masking any affine and linear operation in F2n requires O(t) logical operations,
whereas regular multiplication requires O(t2) logical operations. Hence regular
multiplication is significant operation in CGPQR masking scheme and its effi-
ciency can be increased by minimizing the number of regular multiplications in
a field for a cryptographic algorithm.
MiMC is constructed using a monomial x3 in F2n . Evaluation of this mono-
mial in each round requires only one multiplication and hence is optimized for
CGPQR higher order masking scheme.
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7 Conclusions
We have reconsidered a 20-year old cipher design idea, given a thorough security
analysis, and demonstrated that it can be very competitive in emerging new
applications of symmetric cryptography: SNARKs. It might seem that the use-
fulness of the design is limited to this setting, as the number of rounds is high
compared to other more “traditional” designs for symmetric primitives. However
there is evidence that the opposite is true, which was recently discovered in a
follow-up work [GRR+16]. Due to its very simple design and despite the high
number of rounds, it also turned out to be very competitive in a very different
application setting: The currently fastest known MPC protocols with security
against active adversaries. This clearly shows that there is a good use-case for
designs which work natively in GF(p), and we hope that MiMC can inspire more
design proposals and cryptanalysis in this direction.
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A SNARK prover algorithm
Here we give a brief description of the parameters chosen to implement the prover
algorithm for MiMCHash-256 using the MiMC-1025/1025 permutation with a
fixed key. We also briefly describe the prover algorithm for MiMC in a SNARK
setting. For a more detailed description of the SNARK algorithm we refer the
readers to [BSCG+13].
A.1 Complexity of the prover algorithm
Let S be the system of rank-1 quadratic constraints as described in Definition 2
of the article with the tuples (Ai, Bi, Ci) ∈ FN ′+1 for i ∈ [N ]. Fix an arbitrary
subset X = {α1, α2, . . . , αN} of F such that αi = ωi−1 for i ∈ [N ] and ω is
the N th root of unity. Given an input x ∈ Fm and witness w ∈ FN ′ such that
(x,w) ∈ R. The prover algorithm performs the following steps :
1. Choose δ1, δ2, δ3 independently at random from the field F
2. Construct the polynomial
Q(z) :=
F (z)G(z)−H(z)
U(z)
where U(z) := zN − 1 and F,G,H are univariate polynomials of degree N
defined as
F (z) = F0(z) +
N ′∑
i=1
wiFi(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F ′(z)
+δ1U(z)
G(z) = G0(z) +
N ′∑
i=1
wiGi(z) + δ2U(z)
H(z) = H0(z) +
N ′∑
i=1
wiHi(z) + δ3U(z)
Here Fi, Gi, Hi : X → F are the Lagrange basis functions for the correspond-
ing polynomials satisfying the following conditions
Fi(αj) = Aj(i), Gi(αj) = Bj(i), Hi(αj) = Cj(i)
for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N ′} and j ∈ [N ]. Note that for any input x and witness
w if (x,w) ∈ R then U(z) divides F (z)G(z)−H(z).
3. Output the vector (1, δ1, δ2, δ3, w, q) such that q = (q0, q1, . . . qN ) represents
the polynomial Q.
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Note that each of the polynomials F ′, G′, H ′ (hence F,G,H) can be computed
using an inverse FFT which has a complexity O(N logN). Next a multiplicative
coset Y := γX of X = {α1, . . . αN} is chosen such that γ ∈ F−X . The polynomial
Q(z) is computed in two steps
– Evaluate Q′(z) := F
′(z)G′(z)−H′(z)
U(z) on Y point-by-point using the evaluations
of F ′, G′, H ′, U on Y
– Compute Q′(z) using inverse FFT and compute Q(z) := Q′(z) + δ2F ′(z) +
δ2G
′(z) + δ1δ2U(z)− δ3.
The first step out of the above two takes O(N) field operations and the
inverse FFT has the complexity O(N logN).
A.2 Parameters for MiMCHash-256
Over F2n We describe the parameter choices for n = 1025. The hash function
constructed over this particular field promises the same level of security as SHA-
256. For processing a single block we use the MiMC-1025/1025 over F21025 . The
two constraints in each round of MiMC permutation can be combined to obtain a
single rank one quadratic constraint. Hence we get approximately 1025/ log(3) ≈
646 constraints from the permutation together plus an additional constraint for
compression function making the total number of constraints 647. Note that
each round introduces two variables in the constraints hence the number of
witness is 1293 where w1 = x ∈ F21025 is the input to the hash function and
w ∈ (F21025)1293.
In the prover algorithm the number of constraints N should be such that the
principal N -th root exists in F21025 . To satisfy this condition we choose N = 1801
(since 1801 divides |F∗21025 |). This is the smallest number which divides the order
of the multiplicative group corresponding to the finite field and also greater than
647. We add 1154 dummy constraints of the form 0.Xi = 0 to make the total
number of constraint 1801. Note that although the complexity of the prover
algorithm depends on the number of constraints (or number of multiplications)
for a specific algorithm the number of constraints may not be feasible choice for
the FFT algorithm. In such case the complexity actually depends on the best
possible choice of the multiplicative subgroup of F∗2n .
This is not only applicable to MiMC or MiMCHash but a feature of the
SNARK algorithm. In [BSCG+13] a finite field Fp is chosen in such way that
p− 1 is of the form 2t · q.
Over Fp When we use MiMC-p/p over Fp for some prime p (with 1025 or more
bits) to construct the hash function we have the option of choosing p such that
p − 1 = 2l · q. However this yields a very large prime number p. For ≈ 1025
bit security of the keyed permutation it is enough to have 1025/ log(3) ≈ 646
rounds. Hence the number of witness will be 1293 in this case for processing a
single block. Instead of choosing such large prime we can choose p such that p−1
has a prime factor closed to and greater than 1293.
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B Additional security analysis for the case of restrictions
on the Complexity of the Attack.
For simplicity, in this section we limit our discussion to MiMC-n/n. However,
it is straightforward to extend the following results to MiMC-2n/n (where it is
important to consider also the MitM variants of the attacks) or to the variants
of MiMC over the prime fields.
In order to recover the number of rounds of MiMC-n/n (see Sect. 4), we did
not consider any restrictions on the memory and/or on the number of pairs of
plaintexts/ciphertexts that are available to the attacker. Here we show that if
such restrictions hold, then it is possible to decrease the total number of rounds.
Restriction on the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs available
to the attacker. First we study the case in which only 2m pairs of plain-
texts/ciphertexts are available to the attacker, where 1 ≤ m < n.
This restriction is not negligible for the case of the interpolation attack.
Indeed, if the interpolation polynomial has degree 3r after r rounds (that is, if it
has 3r + 1 coefficients), then the attacker needs at least 3r + 2 pairs to construct
this polynomial (remember that she needs one pair to verify the guessed key).
Thus, if 2m − 1 < 3r−1 + 1, the interpolation attack does not work since the
attacker can not construct the interpolation polynomial. In other words, if 2m
pairs of plaintexts/ciphertexts are available to the attacker, then the minimum
number of rounds r is equal to:
r = 1 +
⌊
log2(2
m − 2)
log2 3
⌋
' 1 +
⌊
m
log2 3
⌋
.
Observe that this problem doesn’t arises if the attacker has access to all possible
pairs of plaintexts/ciphertexts. Indeed, remember that the maximum degree of
the interpolation polynomial is 2n − 2 since T 2n−1 ≡ 1 for all T ∈ F2n , that is
the maximum number of coefficients of the interpolation polynomial is 2n − 1.
Since the attacker works in F2n and she has access to all the possible pairs, then
she can (theoretically) compute the interpolation polynomial.
Instead, note that the restriction on the number of texts available to the at-
tacker has no influence on the GCD attacks, since two pairs are always sufficient
to implement the attack. In this case, the cost of the attack remains r2 · 3r and
we target a cost of 2n so that r2 · 3r ' 2n, that is
r + 2 log3(r) ' n log3(2).
Thus, we’re interested to find a good approximation to the previous equivalence.
Note that when the attacker has access to all the possible pairs of texts, then
the interpolation attack is more efficient than the GCD attacks (see Sect. 4),
thus we are not interested to study the GCD attack in detail (indeed, in this
case if MiMC is secure against the interpolation attack then it is automatically
secure against the GCD attack). Instead, when the attacker has access to a limit
number of pairs, then we don’t have any argumentation to do this claim a priori.
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In order to find an approximated solution of the above equation, the idea is
to use the mathematical methods provided by the Perturbation Theory. That is,
the idea is to look for r of the form r = n log3(2) − ε, where ε  n log3(2). By
simple computation7, it is simple to obtain:
r '
⌈
n log3(2)− 2 log3
(
n log3 2
)⌉
.
In conclusion, if only 2m pairs are available (with m < n), then r is given by:
r = max
{
1 +
⌊
m
log2 3
⌋
,
⌈
n log3(2)− 2 log3
(
n log3 2
)⌉}
.
For the particular case in which n = 129, if m ≤ 115 then r = 74, while
r = 1 +
⌈
m · log3 2
⌉
if m > 115.
Finally, we note that if an attacker has access to a limit number of texts,
then the minimum number of rounds to protect MiMC against algebraic attacks
is deduced using both the GCD attack and the interpolation attack. If instead
sufficiently many pairs of plaintexts/ciphertexts are available to an attacker then
the interpolation attack is sufficient to deduce the minimum number of rounds.
Restriction on the memory available to the attacker. Secondly, we con-
sider the case in which there is a restriction on the memory available to the
attacker. Note that this restriction affects the interpolation attack and the GCD
attack in the same way. Indeed, the problem arises if the attacker is not able
to store all the coefficients of the interpolation polynomial (and similar for the
GCD attack). For example, in the case of MiMC-129/129 where the number of
rounds is 82, the attacker needs (382 + 1) · 129 bits ' 2134 bytes to store all the
coefficients of the interpolation polynomial.
Thus, suppose that the attacker can store only 2m coefficients, where 2m ≤
2n. In MiMC-n/n, each coefficient requires of n/4 bytes to be stored. Thus, this
is equivalent to suppose that only n · 2m−2 bytes are available to the attacker.
Then, since the number of coefficients of the interpolation polynomial (similar
for the GCD attack) depends on the number of rounds, we have the restriction
that 2m ≤ 3r + 1, that is, the number of rounds r is given by:
r ' ⌈log3(2m − 1)⌉.
For example, in the case of MiMC-129/129, suppose that only 264 bytes (that
is, approximately 84 exabytes or 84 million of terabytes) are available to the
attacker. Then, 38 rounds are sufficient to protect MiMC-129/129 against the
interpolation, the GCD and the other attacks. Time-memory trade-offs might
well be possible, and we leave this as a topic for future research.
7 We use the approximation log3
[
log3(2
n − ε)]≈ log3[log3(2n)].
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C More experiments with SNARK implementations of
MiMC
In order to find out how the performance of the implementation changes with
different-sized multipliers we performed a number of experiments which we detail
here. The result is that the runtime grows very slowly, i.e. when moving from a
100-bit multiplication to a 800-bit multiplication the runtime less than doubles.
We experimented with different block sizes of the MiMC permutation in the
SNARK setting, and always adjusted the required number of rounds accordingly.
The time taken by the SNARK implementation for processing one block input
for different block sizes (and hence round numbers) is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Time vs. Blocksize for a SNARK implementation of MiMC
The increment of time with the block size (and hence round numbers) for
SNARK implementation of MiMC appears to be almost linear. We also exper-
imented by fixing the number of rounds of MiMC for different block sizes to a
constant value, and observed the time taken to process a single block by the
SNARK implementation. The result of this experiment is given in Figure 3 and
shows that there is only a very slow increase in the runtime with increased block
size (and hence size of the multiplier). The implementations in C++ can be
found on https://github.com/byt3bit/mimc_snark.git.
Remark 2. For LowMC, in the constraint generation routine we only store the
proper rank-1 constraints which are produced from the multiplications, as de-
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scribed in definition 2. Note that the additions from the linear layer can be
viewed as special rank-1 constraints where Bi = (1, 0, . . . , 0) for the i th con-
straint. We do not store these constraints. However, during the witness gen-
eration process these additions contribute to the complexity of the SNARK
algorithm. The rank-1 constraints are necessary for the prover algorithm (see
appendix E in [BSCG+13]) in SNARK. Saving the constraints corresponding to
the linear layers of the LowMC will only increase the constraint generation time
in Table 3. We point out that this issue does not arise for MiMC in the SNARK
setting.
Fig. 3: Time vs. Blocksize, where the number of rounds is fixed to 700 for all
block sizes
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